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TAKING STOCK OF STOCK AND THE SALE OF
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS: WHEN
IS STOCK NOT A SECURITY?
THOMAS LEE HAZENt
In recent years courts have begun to question the applicability of
the antfraud provisions of state andfederal securities laws to transfers
of controlling interests in closely held corporations. The emerging ma-
jority view is that a sale of one hundredpercent of the stock in a closely
held corporation, coupled with a transfer of active management, consti-
tutes a "sale of business, " rather than a "sale of securities, " and, there-
fore, does not trigger theprotectiveprovisions of the securities laws. In
this article Professor Hazen presents an overview of the law relating to
interests that constitute a "security," analyzes the case law dealing with
the "sale of business" doctrine, andproposes a legalframeworkfor de-
termining when shares of stock should not be treated as securities. He
concludes that corporate stock, unless it is stripped of all its traditional
attributes, falls within the statutory defnition of a security; and that
courts should refrain from manipulating the dinition of "security" in
an effort to exempt transfers of ownershp of closely held corporations
from the antffraud provisions of the securities laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a great deal of judicial and scholarly interest in the securi-
ties laws as they apply to publicly held corporations. Although federal and
state securities laws contain several exemptions from their registration require-
ments for the financing of closely held corporations,1 the general antifraud
t Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972,
Columbia University. Research for this article was supported by a grant from the North Carolina
Law Center.
I. See, e.g., SEC Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.256 (1981); SEC Regulation D, 47 Fed.
Reg. 11,262 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-506). See generally J.W. HICKS, Ex-
EMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (7A Securities Law Series, rev. ed.
1981); PRACTICING LAW INST., 386 CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES,
PRIVATE AND SMALL BUSINESS OFFERINGS (1982); Benton & Gunderson, Venture Capital Financ-
ings and Exemptions'from Registration Under the SecuritiesAct of 1933: Section 4(2), Rule 146, and
Rule 242, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 23 (1981); Boltz & Wickersham, Small Business and the SEC.
Recent SEC Initiatives to Facilitate Small Business Financing, 55 CALIF. ST. B.J. 246 (1980);
Cam p bell, The Plight of Small ssuers Under the Securities1ct of 1933: Practical Foreclosurefrom
the Capital Market, 1977 DUKEa L.J. 1139; Green & Brecher, When Making a Small Public Offering
Under RegulationA (with forms) (pts. 1 & 2), 26 PRAc. LAW., Mar. 1, 1980, at 25, Apr. 15, 1980, at
41; Miller, The Particepation of National Banks in Private Placements of Corporate Securities, 13
NEW ENG. L. REV. 63 (1977); Moore & Balman, Regulation D: Revised FederalRulesfor Limited& Private Offerings of Securities, 53 OKLA. B.J. 810 (1982); Savage, Complance Requirements for
Small Issuers Under the Federal Securities Act and the Connecticut Uniform SecuritiesAct, 55
CONN. B.J. 489 (1981); Soraghan, Private Offerings: Determining "Access," "Vnestment Sophistica-
tion," and '"bility to Bear Economic Risk," 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1980); Thomforde, Exemptions
from SEC Registration for Small Businesses, 47 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1979); Note, Securities Regula-
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provisions of the securities acts apply to both exempt securities and exempt
transactions. 2 For example, whenever a securities sale or purchase is made,
the parties are held to full disclosure so long as the transaction meets the mini-
mal jurisdictional requirements of the federal act.3 A number of recent cases
have focused on the question of the applicability of the securities laws to trans-
fers of controlling interests in closely held corporations.4 The majority of deci-
sions on point have held that the sale of one hundred percent of the stock
coupled with active management constitutes the sale of a business and is thus
not included in the definition of a security. 5 This article will explore what has
become known as the "sale of business" doctrine. The thesis to be presented is
that although there may be good reasons for excluding such transactions from
the securities laws, this goal should not be accomplished by manipulating the
definition of "security."
After briefly defining the problem, the article will present an overview of
the law relating to what constitutes a security, and will then turn to cases that
deal specifically with the "sale of business" doctrine and the issue of when
shares of stock are not securities. Finally, the article concludes that contrary
to the current trend of the case law, corporate stock, unless it is contractually
stripped of all its traditional attributes, falls within the statutory definition of a
security.
II. THE PROBLEM DEFINED
When a sole proprietor decides to sell his or her business, the only con-
straints in terms of full disclosure lie within the confines of common-law
tion: Improved Financing,4lterations for Small Issuers, 38 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 875 (1981); Note,
Rule 242 and Section 4(6) Securities Registration Exemptions: Recent Attempts to Aid Small Busi-
ness, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 73 (1981); see also Barron, Control andRestricted Securities, 8 SEc.
REG. L.J. 261 (1980); Buckley, Small Issues Under the Ontario Securities Act, 1978: A Plea/or
Exemptions, 29 U. TORONTO L.J. 309 (1979); Cheek, Exemptions Under the Proposed Federal Se-
curities Code, 30 VAND. L. REv. 355 (1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d, 78c(12) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see also UNIF. SECURITIES ACT
§ 402, 7A U.L.A. 638 (1958). For discussion of the scope of the general antifraud provisions, see
generally A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIE FRAUD (1982;
5B A. JACOBS, THE IMPACr OF RULE 10B-5 (rev. ed. 1980); Folk, CivilLiabilities Under the Federal
Securities Acts: The BarChris Case (pt. 2), 55 VA. L. REV. 199, 201-16 (1969); Hazen, A Look
Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641 (1978); Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section
12(2) and How It Compares with Rule 10b-5, 13 HoUs. L. REV. 231 (1976).
For cases explicitly applying rule lob-5 to closely held corporations, see, e.g., Golden v.
Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Brown v. Ivie, 661 F.2d 62(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 990 (1982); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1980); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat
Ryan & Assocs. 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
3. The federal act is called into play whenever the parties to a purchase or sale of a security
utilize an instrumentality of interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1Ob-5 (1981). There is no requirement of a minimum amount in controversy and even an
intrastate phone call has been held to suffice. E.g., Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir.
1982); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1975); Aquionics Acceptance Corp. v. Kollar, 503
F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1974); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
4. See infra notes 54-110 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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fraud. Generally, there is no affirmative duty to disclose information known
by the seller but not known by the purchaser unless some special relationship
exists between them. 6 Because the purchaser of a business generally operates
at arm's length vis-A-vis the seller, and because no special or fiduciary relation-
ship exists between them, the transaction will be governed by the doctrine of
caveat emptor. Accordingly, unless the purchaser can show an intentional, or
in some cases a reckless affirmative misrepresentation, he will probably be
without a remedy under common law unless express warranties were included
in the transaction.
On inroad upon the rule of caveat emptor has arisen in instances when the
manager of a business has withheld material facts. For example, a director of
a closely held corporation selling his shares was held liable for describing the
company as a "gold mine" but failing to disclose that it was on the verge of
bankruptcy.7 The court held that defendant's special position as a corporate
director created the duty to convey this information in a face-to-face transac-
tion,8 although normally corporate directors do not have a duty to convey
information to the general public.9 In another, more familiar example, the
United States Supreme Court held it to be actionable nondisclosure that the
hidden purchaser of plaintiff's shares was a director of the company.10 These
cases may be construed as imposing more stringent standards of disclosure
when the interests transferred are those of a closely held business that has been
incorporated. This interpretation both has merit and is logical, because the
seller is by definition also an insider. Such decisions, however, represent the
most liberal extensions of the common law and thus may depart from the
mainstream analysis. It follows that the injured purchaser is well advised to
look elsewhere for protection.
When asking whether the sale of all the stock in a corporation constitutes
a sale of a "security," there is necessarily raised the more general question
whether the mere act of incorporation should change the obligations of an
owner when he decides to sell the business. The decision to incorporate brings
to the business several attributes that are deemed advantageous to the owner;
otherwise, incorporation would not be undertaken." It is not unreasonable to
attach corresponding burdens, especially when the corporate form triggers the
need for the increased protection of others.
6. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (4th ed. 1971).
7. Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974). The court reasoned: "The
rule is that even though a vendor may have no duty to speak under the circumstances, neverthe-
less if he does assume to speak he must make a full and fair disclosure as to the matters he
discusses." Id. at 139, 209 S.E.2d at 501.
8. The court observed that "it is settled law in this jurisdiction that when the circumstances
make it the duty of the seller to apprise the buyer of defects in the subject matter of the sale known
to the seller but not to the buyer, suppression of the defects constitutes fraud." Id. at 140, 209
S.E.2d at 501.
9. See e.g., Lanza v.. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F.
614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Dovy v. Cory, 1901 A.C. 477.
10. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
11. See Hazen, The Decision to Incorporate, 58 NEB. L. REv. 627 (1979).
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III. THE DEFINITION OF SECURITY-AN OVERVIEW 12
When Congress drafted the Securities Act of 193313 it was quite mindful
of the effects of the Great Depression and the stock market crash of 1929. The
legislative history of the Act makes it clear that the primary congressional in-
tent was to foreclose the types of fraud in the capital stock and bond markets
that had aggravated the severity of the crash. 14 It therefore cannot be doubted
that the Act was intended to cover traditional investment instruments such as
stocks and bonds. Additionally, in order to guard against sharp promoters, the
legislation eschewed a narrow definition of security and was drafted to cover a
variety of other investment schemes that invite similar abuses.
The definition of "security" that is set out in section 2(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933 is thus an expansive one:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, invest-
ment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a se-
curity, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as
a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.' 5
The definitions contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 193416 and the
state "blue sky" laws17 are substantially the same.18 It is ironic, indeed, that
12. There is voluminous literature on the basic question of what constitutes a "security"
under federal and state securities legislation. See, e.g., Coffey, The Economic Realities of a
"Security'" Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967); Hannan
& Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defning Federal Securities, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1974); Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream
of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971); Mofsky, Some Comments on the Expanding
Defiition of "Security," 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (1973). For a recent article in support of a
restrictive definition, see Thompson, The Shrinking Deition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of
a Company's Stock Is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225 (1982).
Accordingly, the discussion that follows is not exhaustive and will describe the relevant cases
only to the extent necessary to discuss the specific issue at hand-whether sale of stock in a small
business should be covered by the securities laws.
13. Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
14. See, eg., 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 121-29 (2d ed. 1961); Douglas & Bates, The
Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE LJ. 171 (1933); Landis, The Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
17. Eg., N.C. GEN STAT. § 78A-2(11) (1981); see also UNIE. SECURITIEs ACT § 401(1), 7A
U.L.A. 628 (1958), which provides:
"Security" means any note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; evidence of in-
debtedness; certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement; collat-
eral-trust certificate; preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable share,
investment contract; voting-trust certificate; certificate of deposit for a security; certificate
of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in payments out of
production under such a title or lease; or, in general, any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
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this definition, which was originally intended to be expansive, is now being
used restrictively by many courts to exclude certain closely held stock from the
coverage of the Act.
Although all the relevant definitions expressly include the term "stock,"
most of the case law interpreting the statutory definition of "security" empha-
sizes the concept of "investment contract." As will be demonstrated more
fully below, many of the cases dealing with the sale of stock as a security
borrow heavily from this line of decision. Accordingly, it is necessary to have
at least a rudimentary understanding of the "investment contract" rubric.
On the first occasion the United States Supreme Court faced the defini-
tional issue, it focused upon the general character of the investment vehicle in
question: a syndicated oil and gas leasehold interest coupled with a drilling
contract.' 9 In finding the leasehold interests to constitute securities, the Court
looked to three factors. First, the Court considered the terms of the offer, in-
cluding the degree of syndication and the fact that the ownership interest did
not carry with it the right to control the day-to-day activities of the business.
Second, the Court looked to the plan of distribution and the widespread mar-
keting techniques that were used. Third, the Court scrutinized the economic
inducements that the promoters held out to the prospective purchasers.20
These factors alone would not appear to cover most transfers of total control
in closely held corporations, because such transfers do not arise in the context
of mass-marketing and syndication.
Just three years after the Supreme Court's seminal decision that oil and
gas drilling plans are securities, it handed down the landmark decision dealing
with the meaning of "investment contract." At issue in SEC v. WJ Howey
Co. ,21 was the subdivision and sale of orange groves. Defendant marketed
small tracts of commercial orange groves and also offered a management con-
tract, under the terms of which a management firm controlled by defendant
would cultivate, pick, and market the fruits of the purchasers' investment. Al-
though the management contract was not tied to the purchase of the land by
the terms of the agreement, the Court noted that the economic realities of the
situation revealed a tying of products.22 This de facto tie-in resulted in the
purchase any of the foregoing. "Security" does not include any insurance or endowment
olicy or annuity contract under which an insurance company promises to pay [a fixed
sum oil money either in a lump sum or periodically for life or for some other specified
period.
18. Compare Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (federal statutory definition con-
strued) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-2(l 1) and UNIF. SECURITIES AcT § 401(1), 7A U.L.A. 628
(1958).
19. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), notedin 12 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
494 (1944) and 17 S. CAL. L. REv. 324 (1944).
20. 320 U.S. at 353. The specific economic inducements, marketing techniques, and repre-
sentations used by a seller of all the stock in a corporation should thus bear heavily upon the
determination of the applicability of the securities laws.
21. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
22. Id. at 300. The plots being offered were so small that an owner could not profitably
arrange for his own harvesting. Since the land and trees were marketed as a productive asset,
there was in fact no real choice but to purchase the management contract. See also SEC v. Tung
Corp. of Am., 32 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Il. 1940).
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purchasers' being asked to make a passive investment, which in turn was suffi-
cient to prompt the Court to characterize the entire package as a security.
. In Howey the Court established a four-factor test that remains the bench-
mark in deciding whether a particular transaction involves an "investment
contract." In the Court's words, "An investment contract for purposes of the
Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
[1] invests his money [2] in a common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits
[4] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." 23 In holding de-
fendant's promotional scheme to constitute a security, the Court in Howey
pointed out that a nominal direct interest in the physical assets of the enter-
prise, such as actually owning the fruit trees, did not preclude a determination
that what was actually marketed and sold was an investment contract. In
other words, the purchaser's role as a passive investor, with a significant di-
vorcement of ownership from control of the enterprise, emerges as one key to
the Howey decision.
In Howey the Court also pointed out that the absence of formal certifi-
cates, stock, or other traditional indicia of investment did not weaken the find-
ing of a security. This rationale is understandable in light of the statute's
express inclusion of "stock" in addition to the concept of an "investment con-
tract." Emphasizing the absence of formality would allow in substance the
practices that the Act was designed to eliminate. In light of the broad statu-
tory definition, the Court's view is especially justifiable. It is, however, quite
another thing to imply the inverse of the Howey ruling and determine that the
presence of formal stock does not preclude a finding that the buyer purchased
only the assets of the business, thus making the securities laws inapplicable.24
When a business is incorporated, the entrepreneur has decided that the corpo-
rate form is advantageous. Hallmarks of incorporation include centralized
management and the potential for the separation of ownership from control.2 5
If the parties choose to structure the transaction in terms of the sale of stock
rather than a sale of assets, it is not unreasonable to force them to accept all
the consequences of that decision, including limited exposure26 to federal and
state securities laws.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Howey, refinements to the four-
factor test have been made. The requirement that the profits be secured
"solely" from the efforts of another has been diluted to require that profits be
23. 328 U.S. at 298-99 (bracketed numerals added). The Howey test remains in force. Cf.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982) (Howey cited and distinguished).
A few states, led by California, have adopted a risk capital test as an alternative to the four
factors in Howey. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811,361 P.2d 906, 13
Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The risk capital test has received little, if any, acceptance in the federal
courts. Furthermore, a risk capital analysis does not shed any light upon the problem at hand:
whether stock is a security.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 54-108.
25. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 3 (rev. ed. 1946); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159
(1976); Rev. Rul. 79-106, 1979-1 C.B. 448.
26. The exposure is limited because there are significant exemptions for small issues and
small issuers. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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derived primarily or substantially from the efforts of others.27 Accordingly, a
security may exist notwithstanding the recognition that efforts of the investor
are necessary for the success of the operation, such as in pyramid sales ar-
rangements,28 founder-membership contracts, and customer referral agree-
ments.29 Courts have also included within the term "securities" transactions
that were denominated, at least in form, as franchise contracts. 30 It is clear,
however, that a bona fide franchise agreement is not a security.31 Similarly, in
most cases a limited partnership interest constitutes a security, 32 and with ap-
propriate facts even a general partnership interest has been included in the
definition. 33
In all of the foregoing decisions finding a security to exist, the courts em-
phasized the investor's reliance on the efforts of others to make the transaction
a success from his or her point of view. In the case of a transfer of all or
substantially all of the stock in a closely held company for which the purchaser
is to become the manager of the business, there in fact is no such separation of
ownership from control, although the corporate structure provides a ready
mechanism for such a separation. Because this purchase is not a passive in-
vestment, many courts have found no investment contract-and hence, no se-
curity-to exist.34 As will be seen below, the major error in such an analysis
27. E.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Tur-
ner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
As the court in Koscot explained:
In view of these developments and our analysis of the import of the language in and
the derivation of the Howey test, we hold that the proper standard in determining
whether a scheme constitutes an investment contract is that explicated by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in SEC v. Glen [sic] W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra. In that case, the court
announced that the critical inquiry is "whether the efforts made by those other than the
investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which af-
fect the failure or success of the enterprise." [474 F.2d] at 482.
497 F.2d at 483.
28. E.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
29. E.g., Florida Discount Centers v. Antinori, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970); State v. Hawaii
Mkt. Center, 52 Hawaii 642,485 P.2d 105 (1971). But see, e.g., Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers,
2892 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968); Georgia Mkt. Centers v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d
620 (1969).
30. Eg., Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
31. E.g., Martin v. T.V. Tempo, Inc., 628 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980); Nash & Assocs., Inc. v.
Lum's of Ohio, 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973); L.H.M., Inc. v. Lewis, 371 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.J.
1974), aft'dmem., 5 10 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1975); Weibolt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), modfledin amount, 460 F.2d
666 (10th Cir. 1972); Coleman,/A Franchise Agreement: Not a "Securiy" Under the Securities Act
of 1933, 22 Bus. LAW. 493 (1967). See generally Freeman,An Analysis of the Franchise Agreement
Under Federal Securities Laws, 27 SYRAcusE L. REv. 919 (1976).
32. See, e.g., Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal.
App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1961).
33. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422-25 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981);
Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
34. Eg., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654
F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); see infra text accompanying notes 54-108. See generally Comment, The
Sale ofa Close Corporation Through a Stock Transfer: Coveredby the Federal Securities Laws?, 11
SEToN HALL L. REv. 749 (1981); Comment, Securities Regulation-Is Stock a Security?, 30 U.
KAN. L. REv. 117 (1981); Recent Decisions, Securities Regulation-Security Defined, 30 EMORY
L.J. 1212 (1981).
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arises in focusing upon the concept of "investment contract" rather than the
express statutory inclusion of "stock" as a security.
. The refinements of the Howey test have not been limited to the factor of
the investor's reliance upon the efforts of others. The Court has also elabo-
rated upon the expectation of a profit,35 a critical factor when considering the
transfer of a closely held corporation. The decision that comes to bear most
closely upon the question of stock as a security in this context is the Supreme
Court's ruling in United Housing Foundation v. Forman.36 In the Forman deci-
sion the Court ruled that shares of stock in a cooperative residential housing
project did not fall within the definition of "security" under the Act. Mere
denomination of the shares as "stock" was not dispositive, although as pointed
out above, stock is expressly included in the Act's definition of security. Since
the "stock" in Forman lacked traditional stock attributes, the Court held that it
was not within the statutory definition of stock. 37 The Court then went on to
examine whether the defendants were marketing investment contracts. On
this issue, the Court upheld substance over form and focused upon the eco-
nomic reality of the investment venture. The decision distinguished resort
condominium cases in which an individual might well be induced to purchase
the property primarily for investment,38 since the building in question in For-
man was used as a bona fide primary residence. Although the other criteria of
the four-factor Howey test may have been met, there was no expectation of a
profit, even though rent reductions in terms of profits rebated from commer-
cial properties were, at best, tangential to the stock, and thus the residential
lease agreements were properly characterized as residential housing contracts
35. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) the Court
touched upon this and other issues. The Supreme Court ruled that a compulsory, noncontributory
defined-benefit employee pension plan is not a security within the meaning of the 1933 Act. The
Court noted the involuntary nature of the plan and the absence of employee contributions (I.e., no
investments of money). These factors strongly negated any inference that a security was involved.
The court also noted that when faced with a defined-benefit plan, the payment to the employee
upon retirement bears no relation to the employee's contribution in terms of time in service.
Another factor for the Daniel Court was the lack of a substantial expectation of profit. Be-
cause the largest part of the eventual retirement benefits is derived from the employer's contribu-
tions, rather than from reinvestment income derived from the efforts of pension plan managers,
the Court held the profit aspects of the plan were too insubstantial to fall within the concept of an
investment contract. In addition, the Court focused upon a number of contingencies to the vesting
of the plan that rendered any "profit" too speculative to justify a reasonable expectation.
Because of the many factors involved in the Daniel decision, however, it cannot be assumed
that a pension plan will never be characterized as a security. See Stansbury & Bedol, Interests in
Employee BeneFt Plans as Securities: Daniel and Beyond, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 226 (1980); see also
Tomlinson, Securities Regulation ofEmployee Stock Ownersho Plans.- A Comparison of SECpoilcy
and Conpgessional Intent, 31 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1978). For example, a voluntary contribution
plan.with a variable annuity might well be found subject to the securities laws. Cf. SEC v. Varia-
ble Ainuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuity held to be a security).
36. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
37. Id. at 851.
38. Id. at 851-52; see Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980); Ro-
senbaum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Laws-A Case Study in Governmen-
talInflexibility, 60 VA. L. REv. 785 (1974); Annot., 52 A.L.R. FED, 146 (1981);seealso Williamson
v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (real estate joint venture held
to be a security).
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rather than as investment contracts. 39
In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the Court used the eco-
nomic reality test to exclude a bank's certificate of deposit from the operation
of the securities laws. 40 The Court reached that result even through the certifi-
cate could properly be classified as a note, which would bring it within the
statutory definition.
Employing the economic reality test4 ' that was adopted in Forman, but at
the same time ignoring the factor of profit expectation, some courts have held
that the sale of stock in a closely held corporation is not a sale of "securities,"
especially if it is essentially a transfer of the corporation's assets.42 One court
has held that the sale of fifty percent of the outstanding shares is not a sale of
securities that would subject the transaction to either state or federal securities
regulation.43 It may be significant that these decisions, like the most recent
Supreme Court pronouncements, have used the economic reality test to restrict
coverage of the securities laws, as contrasted to the earlier decisions that used
the test to expand the Act's scope in regulating unconventional investments.
In these cases the courts have reasoned that since full ownership of a closely
held corporation involves neither a pooling of interest nor a common enter-
prise, the economic reality test requires a finding of no security. 4 This reason-
ing, however, ignores two integral aspects of the Forman decision. First,
Forman involved a scheme in which there was no expectation of a profit. In
contrast, when purchasing a business, whether or not through stock ownership,
the purchaser surely expects a profit. The absence of this expectation in the
Forman decision was given sufficient treatment in the Court's opinion to
render it a substantial factor in the holding. In all the sale of business cases,
there is a traditional profit motive. Second, the Supreme Court pointed out in
Forman that the cooperative housing package presented none of the
benchmarks of stock as it is normally defined.45 As will be explained more
fully below, closely held stock does not fall in the same category, even when
there is only one shareholder.
Properly viewed, the facts of Forman failed to satisfy two of the four
39. 421 U.S. at 855-58.
40. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982); f. Meason v. Bank of Miami, 652 F.2d
542 (5th Cir. 198 1) (inquiring into the "economic realities" underlying the commercial/investment
dichotomy), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); Union Planters Nat!I Bank v. Commercial Credit
Business Loans, 651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir.) (loan participation agreement not a security), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); C.N.S. Enter. v. G. & G. Enter., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.) (discussing
how the commercial/investment distinction influences the characterization of short-term notes as
securities), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951)
(discussing the "service contract"/"investment contract" distinction). But see Exchange Nat'l
Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976) (rejecting the commercial/investment
distinction).
41. See Coffey, supra note 12; Hannan & Thomas, supra note 12.
42. E.g., Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981);
Anchor-Darling Indus. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp.
952 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also infra note 54.
43. Oakhill Cemetery v. Tri-State Bank, 513 Supp. 885 (N.D. IM. 1981).
44. Anchor-Darling Indus. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
45. 421 U.S. at 851 (citations omitted).
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Howey investment contract factors: the lack of either a common enterprise or
an expectation of profit. By contrast, in the case of the sale of a business, the
profit motive is not lacking. The sale of a business, however, does arguably
lack the common enterprise element. In a related area, some courts have held
that the absence of a common enterprise precludes a finding that a managed
commodity or stock brokerage account is, in and of itself, a security. 46 Never-
theless, a number of courts have found a security to exist on such facts.47 It is
thus questionable whether the absence of commonality in the sale of a busi-
ness should be sufficient to tip the balance against the finding of a security. In
any event, the most important criticism of the courts' reliance upon the Howey
factors is that the factors are derived from an interpretation of the statutory
term "investment contract," rather than from a proper focus upon the statute's
express inclusion of "stock."
The Court in Forman made a great effort to emphasize that the "stock" in
a housing cooperative is completely different from shares in a business ven-
ture, which are the true subjects of the securities acts. In the Court's own
words:
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor could they,
that they were misled by use of the word "stock" into believing that
the federal securities laws governed their purchase. Common sense
suggests that people who intend to acquire only a residential apart-
ment in a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are not
likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing investment securi-
ties simply because the transaction is evidenced by something called
a share of stock. These shares have none of the characteristics "that
in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a secur-
ity." . . . Despite their name, they lack what the Court in Tcher-
epnin deemed the most common feature of stock: the right to receive
"dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits." . . . Nor
do they possess the other characteristics traditionally associated with
stock: they are not negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothe-
cated; they confer no voting rights in proportion to the number of
shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value. In short, the in-
ducement to purchase was solely to acquire subsidized low-cost liv-
ing space; it was not to invest for profit.
48
There is no doubt that stock in a closely held business cannot be classified in
such a sui generis fashion, unless, of course, it is saddled with a wealth of
unusual restrictions and conditions. In fact, closely held stock has all of the
attributes that were lacking in Forman. The importance of this issue, the stat-
utory concept of "stock," is heightened by the Supreme Court's only passing
46. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972);
Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aJ'dmem., 491 F.2d 752
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974).
47. See, e.g., Noa v. Key Futures, 638 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Continental Commodi-
ties Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132 (8th
Cir. 1970); SEC v. International Mining Exch., 515 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Colo. 1981).
48. 421 U.S. at 851 (citations omitted).
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treatment of the circuit court's "alternative holding" as to the meaning of "in-
vestment contract.
' 49
IV. THE SALE OF BUSINESS CASES
It is the thesis of this article that although good reasons for excluding the
sale of closely held corporations from the securities laws' purview may exist,
,this -goal should be accomplished, if at all, through statutory amendment
rather than by a judicial twisting of the statutory definition of "security." By
its terms, the 1933 Securities Act exempts from its registration provisions those
transactions that do not involve a public offering.50 The state "blue sky" laws
have comparable exemptions.5 1 Similarly, the periodic reporting require-
ments of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 apply only to publicly held com-
panies.52  Under each of these statutes, however, the general :antifraud
provisions apply to securities transactions regardless of any exemption from
the registration or reporting requirements.53 Clearly, legislatures were aware
of the need to ease the burden on issuers and sellers of small amounts of secur-
ities. Realizing at the same time the need for some minimum investor protec-
tion in small transactions by virtue of the antifraud provisions, the legislatures
expressly included "stock" as a security. Many courts seem to have lost sight
of this balance.
Over the past several years there has been a flurry of cases dealing with
the question whether a sale of an entire business, even though in a stock trans-
action, is subject to the securities laws. The overwhelming majority of the
cases that have squarely faced the issue have held that the sale of one hundred
percent of the stock in a closely held corporation is not a security.54 Courts
49. Id.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976); see also id. § 77c(b); SEC Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-
.256 (1981); SEC Regulation D, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,262 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-
.506); supra note 1.
51. UNIF. SECURITIEs AcT §§ 402(b)(I), (9), 7A U.L.A. 640-41 (1958).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g) (Supp. IV 1980).
53. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d, 78c(12) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see also supra note 2.
54. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir.
1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966 (10th Cir. Apr. 19, 1977); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista
Resources, 534 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Somogyi v. Butler, 518 F. Supp. 970 (D.N.J. 1981); Anchor-Darling Indus. v.
Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. IIL. 1981); Ducker v. Turner, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) % 97,386 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 1979); Tech Resources v. Estate of Hub-
bard, 246 Ga. 583, 272 S.E.2d 314 (1980); Condux v. Neldon, 83 Ill. App. 3d 575, 404 N.E.2d 523
(1980); see also McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
T 97,841 (7th Cir. May 20, 1981) (accepting but not applying the sale of business doctrine);
Thompson, supra note 12; cf. Stacey v. Charles J. Rogers, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(holding sale of business doctrine inapplicable on facts); Kane v. Fischbach, [Current] FED. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) % 98,608 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1982) (sale of partnership not subject to the securities
laws). See generally Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business Doctrine" Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 637 (1982); Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a
Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57
N.Y.U.L. REv. 225 (1982); Comment, The Sale of a Close Corporation Through a Stock Transfer:
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have even gone so far as to hold that the sale of more than fifty percent of a
corporation's outstanding stock creates a presumption that the transaction is
not a sale of securities which would subject the sale to regulation under the
securities acts. s5 The basic theory of these decisions is that since the purchaser
will be actively running the business, there is neither an element of commonal-
ity nor a reliance on the efforts of others-two of the four Holvey factors.56 In
contrast, only a few of the more recent decisions have held that such a transfer
is subject to the securities laws.57
In the first case to decide the point, the Fourth Circuit held that the sale of
an entire business through a transfer of shares is subject to the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws.5 8 The court reached this result by looking
to the terms of the statutory definition. Defendants claimed that the transac-
tion at issue was in essence a sale of assets, which was a matter of state law.
The Fourth Circuit responded with a "strong presumption" of inclusion for
instruments such as stock that fall under the literal definition of the statute.5 9
In so ruling the court pointed to a significant factor: the transaction could
easily have been structured so as not to involve a security, but the parties chose
otherwise.60 This literal interpretation of the statute6l has fallen into disrepute
because of what many lower courts have viewed to be the appropriate impact
of the Supreme Court's "economic reality" test.62 Such a rationale represents
an unfortunate misapplication of the doctrine. In all other instances, the eco-
nomic reality test has been limited to borderline cases rather than extended to
instruments that fall literally within the statutory language. This limitation on
the use of a pragmatic approach would not be unique under the securities
laws. 63 A pragmatic analysis, however, generally should not be employed
Covered by the Federal Securities Laws?, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 749 (1981); Comment, Acquisi.
lion 0fBusinesses Through Purchase of Corporate Stock: An Argumentfor Exclusion from Federal
Securities Regulation, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 295 (1980); Recent Decisions supra note 34; Note,
Securities Law-Sale of Business by Transfer of 100%9 of Corporate Stock Not Governed by Securl-
ties Law, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 487 (1982).
55. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); Oakhil Cemetery v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F.
Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see infra text accompanying notes 79-94; see also King v. Winkler, 673
F.2d 342, 346 (11th Cir. 1982). Contra Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1979); Coffin v.
Polishing Machs., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 21-34.
57. Cole v. PPG Indus., 680 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1982); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d
Cir. 1982); Sterling Recreation Org. Co. v. Segal, 537 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Colo. 1982) (rejecting the
sale of business doctrine under the investment contract test but remanding for factual findings);
Mifflin Energy Sources v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980); see also Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Titsch
Printing, v. Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925
(E.D. Pa. 1976); cf. Katz v. Abrams, 549 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (the sale of business doctrine
does not exclude the transfer of all the stock from the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S definition
of security); Aina Capital Assoc. v. Wagner, 532 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
58. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1023 (1974).
59. Id. at 1261.
60. Id. at 1262.
61. Id.; see also Sterling Recreation Org. v. Segal, 537 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Colo. 1982); Titsch
Printing v. Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978).
62. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
63. See for example the cases dealing with "non-garden-variety transactions" and prohibi-
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when the statute applies by its very terms.64
In the first decision to eschew a literal approach to the sale of one hun-
dred percent of a corporation's stock, the court relied on "economic realities"
in labeling the transaction a sale of assets rather than of stock. 65 The court
observed that as the purchaser of a liquor store, plaintiff depended solely upon
his entrepreneurial efforts for the success of his investment. A later decision,
which has been the basis for the mainstream of cases to date, held that in such
a case the operative language of the statute is not whether the transaction in
question involves "stock," but whether it constitutes a "investment contract"
under the Howey test and its subsequent refinements. 66 This shift has been
properly described as "a significant expansion of the Howey test." 67 Neverthe-
less, the rationale has continued to flourish and has been adopted by at least
two circuit courts of appeals.
68
The Seventh Circuit has applied the investment contract analysis to sales
of stock on three occasions.69 In these cases the court held that the form of the
transaction is irrelevant if, in fact, the purchaser is acquiring the entire busi-
ness and will be the primary manager. 70 The court rejected an earlier Fourth
Circuit decision 71 that read the Supreme Court's decision in Forman
72 to com-
tions against insider short-swing profits under the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p n.85 (1981 & Supp.
1982); see Hazen, The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) ofthe Securities Exchange Act, 54
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1975).
64. This appears to be the proper approach for defining a security, and has been adopted by
the Fourth Circuit. Coffin v. Polishing Mach., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 868 (1979); see infra note 74.
65. Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,965 (D.
Colo. Dec. 4, 1975), aft'd, 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977).
66. Bula v. Mansfield, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,964 (D. Colo.
May 13, 1977).
67. Recent Decisions, supra note 34, at 1234 n.117 (1981); see also Dillport, Restoring Balance
to the Defnition ofSecurity, 10 SEc. REG. LJ. 99, 114-15 (1982) (footnotes omitted):
The cases in which shares of stock are not deemed securities present several
problems. First, to the extent that some of the opinions imply that the Ilowey criteria
must always be met, they are based on a reading of Forman which is, as the courts
recognize, debatable. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court did not turn to the Howey
criteria to determine whether the shares were securities until it had concluded that the
stock did not possess characteristics generally associated with common stock. And, al-
though the Court observed that the criteria of Howey have run through all of its deci-
sions, that statement is hardly surprising since all of its previous decisions had involved
investment contracts. It is not clear that the Court intended the observation to be inter-
preted as a requirement that all cases be analyzed by the Howey criteria. Moreover, the
Court recognized that instruments bearing the name of one of the enumerated classes
may well be securities, particularly if they possess the characteristics of the securities
whose name they bear. Analyzing all alleged securities under the Howey test ignores
that admonition.
Second, the reliance on the Court's use of the economic realities of the transaction is
another misinterpretation of the Court's opinion in Forman.
68. See supra notes 54-55. For a more detailed discussion of the facts involved in the rele-
vant cases, see Seldin, supra note 54.
69. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459
(7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. dened, 451 U.S. 1017
(1981).
70. Canfield, 654 F.2d at 466.
71. Coffin v. Polishing Machs., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 36-49.
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pel a different result. The Fourth Circuit, in finding that a sale of one half of a
corporation's stock was subject to the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws, had pointed out that the Court in Forman stressed the lack of traditional
indicia of stock in the housing co-op interest and therefore held that the trans-
action was not covered by the Act.73 In contrast, when dealing with the sale of
a close corporation, the stock is transferable, is likely to appreciate in value,
and carries dividend rights--characteristics that were lacking in Forman .74
The Seventh Circuit has assailed the Fourth for failing to consider either the
economic realities of the transaction or the lack of a common enterprise and
reliance on the efforts of others.75
Nonetheless, one major problem with the economic reality test for invest-
ment contracts should be noted. As applied to the sale of stock, the test elimi-
nates predictability of result. In addition to ignoring the terms of the statutory
definitions, this approach is especially questionable in a transaction that the
parties have voluntarily chosen to structure as a sale of stock. As noted above,
there are many reasons for selecting the corporate form. The protections (or
burdens) of the securities laws may be viewed as a necessary by-product of the
benefits conferred by limited liability, the ability to separate control from own-
ership, and the law's recognition of a separate corporate entity as a person.76
In King v. Winkler 77 the Eleventh Circuit has recently taken an ad hoc ap-
proach to the issue that not only interferes with what would otherwise be a
reasonable expectation of the parties at the time of the transaction, but further
eliminates any degree of predictability:
It is apparent that the approach used here is not a function of
73. 596 F.2d at 1204; see supra text accompanying note 48.
74. The court of appeals observed in Coffin, 596 F.2d at 1204:
We do not believe that Forman denies a purchaser of ordinary corporate stock the
protection of the federal securities laws simply because he intends to participate in the
management of the corporation in which he invests. Both the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77b(l), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), include
"stock" within their definitions of a "security." Thus, when a transaction involves stock,
there is a strong presumption that the statutes apply. Occidental~yfe Insurance Co. v. Pat
Ryan & Associates, Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1261 (4th Cir. 1974). Forman requires us to
analyze the substance of a transaction only when the stocks involved do not have the
"significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument." See For-
man, 421 U.S. 837, 850-51, 95 S. Ct. 2051, 2060, 44 L. Ed. 2d 621.
Absent some showing that ordinary corporate stocks are other than what they ap-
pear to be, we need not consider whether an investor will derive his profit partly from his
own efforts. The test drawn from SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298, 66 S. Ct. 1100,
90 L. Ed. 1244 (1946), applies to interests not easily recognized as securities in the capital
market. It does not apply to stock that comes within the clear language of the securities
acts. The court in Forman, for example, applied the Howey test only after deciding that
the shares under consideration were not like ordinary capital stock. See Forman 421
U.S. 837, 850-53, 95 S. Ct. 2051, 44 L. Ed. 2d 621; Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp.
925, 929-30 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
75. Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459,465 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway,
637 F.2d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). It has been recognized that these
and similar decisions present "close" and "possibly questionable" readings of the facts. Seldin,
supra note 54, at 648.
76. For most purposes, whether by way of statute or caselaw, a corporation is a "person."
See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 80 (2d ed. 1970).
77. 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982).
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numbers. A sale of less than 100% of the stock might not be covered
by the Acts. A sale of 100% of the stock can be covered by the Acts.
The number of sellers and purchasers will not necessarily control the
outcome. Once the literal words of the statute are abandoned for an
"economic realities" test, each case must be evaluated on its own
facts to determine if the transaction, though within the letter of the
statute, is not within its spirit nor the intent of the lawmakers. For-
man, 421 U.S. at 849, 95 S. Ct. at 2059. Although there will necessar-
ily be close cases at the margin of this principle, this case comes
clearly into focus. The purchasers were buying and the seller was
selling a business. The stock was the vehicle of transfer. The pur-
chasers' expectation of profit would come from their own efforts, not
those of others. This was not a security transaction or investment
contract intended to be governed by the Federal Securities Acts. 78
A logical but unrealistic extension of the court's reasoning might be to
exclude a stock payment plan to the single manager of a business although the
bulk of stock is held by passive investors. Such a result would seem to be in
conflict with both the language and focus on the securities laws, and shows the
dangers inherent in the Eleventh Circuit's method of analysis.
It may well be, however, that these transactions involving transfer of all
the stock and management of a closely held business are too local in nature to
warrant federal involvement. If that is so, Congress should respond by
amending the jurisdictional provisions of the securities laws to provide an ex-
plicit exemption for what in essence is the sale of a business. Alternatively,
Congress could set out an exclusion for transactions that have a de minimis
effect upon interstate commerce, the securities markets, or securities transac-
tions in general. In the absence of such legislative reform, the courts should
veer away from the ad hoc method of analysis profferred by the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits.
Unfortunately, courts have taken the next logical step suggested by the
approach of the Eleventh Circuit and have held that a transaction involving
the sale of one-half of a company's stock is not subject to the securities laws.
In Oakhill Cemetery v. Tri-State Bank79 plaintiff purchased from defendant
500,000 shares, which constituted fifty percent of the company's outstanding
stock. This sale was coupled with an agreement transferring control of the
company to the purchaser. The transaction was followed by the company's
repurchase of the remaining 500,000 shares from a nonparty to the lawsuit.80
The court telescoped the two-step transaction into the sale of one hundred
percent of the company's stock and then held that the transfer was not subject
to the securities laws under the sale of business doctrine.8 ' Although clearly
establishing that a sale of less than all of the stock when coupled with control
78. Id. at 346.
79. 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. I11. 1981).
80. Plaintiff also purchased a note that the court held was subject to the securities laws, but
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could satisfy the sale of business doctrine, the decision also presented the hold-
ing that the transaction lacked the element of deception necessary to state a
claim under SEC rule lOb-5.8 2 The nondeception ruling may be a significant
reflection of the court's true concern, since it involved a finding that the case
really concerned claims of corporate mismanagement, which is generally a
matter of state law rather than an issue touching the federal domain of inves-
tor protection.8 3 A third ground for the court's dismissal of the complaint in
Oakhill was that plaintiff lacked standing to sue under rule lOb-5. 8 4 These
other holdings would have been sufficient and weaken the precedential effect
of the court's reliance on the sale of business doctrine.
The Oakhill ruling has been criticized even by those who support the sale
of business doctrine.85 Furthermore, the result in Oakhill had been eschewed
in several earlier cases.86 In fact, the first case to recognize an implied right of
action under rule lOb-5 involved a similar fact pattern.8 7 In any event, the
OakhilI decision does stand as evidence of the willingness of one court to ex-
tend the approach adopted by the Eleventh Circuit. This form of reasoning is
particularly troubling in light of the general types of abuses that have been
known to occur in the transfer of controlling interests of less than all of a
corporation's stock.88 Elimination of the protection afforded by the general
antifraud provisions of the securities laws further exacerbates the problem. In
spite of these difficulties, however, the Eleventh Circuit in Iing v. Winkler and
the district court in Oakhill laid the groundwork for an increasingly large body
of law.
That groundwork for such an interpretation under the sale of business
doctrine was most recently expanded by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Sutter v. Groen.89 The court not only reaffirmed its earlier position,90 but
82. Id. at 890-92. On the issue of deception, see Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut.
Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979); Kidwell v. Meikle,
597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54 (7th
Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978);
Wright & Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
83. See generally Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of/Santa Fe: Rule 1ob.5 and the New
Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263 (1980); Hazen, Corporate Mismanagement and the Federal
SecuritiesActsrAntifraudProvisions: A Familiar Path with Some New Detours, 20 B.C.L. REv. 819
(1979); Krendl, The Progeny fSanta Fe v. Green: An Analysis ofthe Elements ofa Fiduciary Duty
Claim Under Rule Job-5 and a Casefor a Federal Corporation Law, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 231 (1981).
84. 513 F. Supp. at 890 n.9.
85. See Seldin, supra note 54, at 677 ("The court's opinion contained no justification for so
expanding the doctrine"); Comment, Acquisition ofBusiness Through Purchase ofCorporate Stock:
An Argumentfor Exclusionfrom Federal Securities Regulation, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 295, 311-12
(1980).
86. Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1979); Coffin v. Polishing Machs., 596 F.2d 1202
(4th Cir.), cert. denied., 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
87. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
88. See generally Hazen, Transfers oCorporate Control and Duties oControlling Sharehold-
ers-Common Law, Tender Offers, Investment Companies-And a Proposal/or Re/arm, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 1023 (1977).
89. 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982).
90. Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637
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expanded the scope of the doctrine by announcing a rebuttable presumption
that it would apply to any transaction involving the transfer of more than fifty
percent of a corporation's common stock. In the words of Judge Posner:
If, as in this case (the complaint alleges that Sutter owns 70 percent
of the common stock of Happy Radio), the purchaser already has, or
by the purchase in question acquires, more than 50 percent of the
common stock of the corporation, his purpose in purchasing the
stock will be presumed to have been entrepreneurship rather than
investment. The presumption can be rebutted by showing that the
purchaser's main purpose was investment.91
The court justified this presumption by emphasizing the focus of the securities
acts upon a shareholder's investment as opposed to his or her entrepreneurial
interest in the business.92
It is no doubt true that there is a significant difference between a share-
holder as investor and a shareholder as proprietor.93 This distinction does not
mean, however, that the two interests cannot overlap, especially when entre-
preneurs voluntarily select a certain form for embodying their proprietary in-
terest. The court's view in Sutter of the economic reality of the transaction
devolves upon the separation of ownership from control as the benchmark of
an investment interest in a corporate enterprise. 94 In finding no such separa-
tion of the facts before it, the court glossed over the formal separation that
necessarily follows from the use of the corporate form.95 Furthermore, when
less than one hundred percent of the stock is transferred, a variety of restric-
tions arise on the majority shareholder's ability to exert total control because
of fiduciary duties owed to the minority shareholders. 96 The "more than fifty
percent" presumption adopted by the court fails to take account of this signifi-
cant limitation on the shareholder's control, which creates a separation of
ownership from control-albeit not a total one.
Under the guise of an economic reality test the Seventh Circuit thus re-
fused to base its analysis upon the plain meaning of the statute. Judge Pos-
ner's justification for rejecting a literal interpretation of the statute emphasizes
the use of the economic reality test in order to best capture the spirit of the
law.97 While this means of interpretation is appropriate in the face of ambigu-
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); see supra notes 69-75 and accompanying
text.
91. 687 F.2d at 203.
92. Id. (relying in part upon A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1932); Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, andEconomic Organi-
zation, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 789 n.14 (1972)).
93. See Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage, Cor-
porate Responsibility and ManagerialAccountability, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 391.
94. See supra note 92.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
96. See generally F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORTY SHAREHOLDERS (1975).
97. "[I]n interpreting statutes as in interpreting Biblical commands, the letter killeth but the
spirit giveth life." 687 F.2d at 200. The Sutter court also relied upon the Supreme Court's ruling
in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982), that a certificate of deposit is not covered by the
securities laws. In so ruling, the Court held that the certificate of deposit lacked the characteristics
of long-term debt instruments, in part because the statutory definition included notes but excluded
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ity, it seems totally inappropriate when the stock in question contains all the
traditional attributes of stock as that term is used in the statutory definition.98
In addition to the questionable statutory construction employed by Judge
Posner in Sutter, there are also very serious problems in properly applying the
presumption. First, does the presumption apply regardless of whether the
complaining party is the purchaser or seller? The court's opinion makes no
such distinction. In the absence of such a distinction, one who has selected the
corporate form and seeks to assert a claim against the purchaser could dis-
cover that his or her antifraud remedies are dependent upon the intent of the
purchaser as to whether the sale of the stock was an entrepreneurial or invest-
ment transaction. The problem could arguably be solved by focusing upon the
intent of the person asserting the securities claim. Nonetheless, this solution
does not appear to be fully satisfactory, because it still fails to provide the
predictability of result that is an absolute necessity for planners of corporate
transactions.
An even more important problem with the presumption announced in
Sutter is that by definition, most tender offers would be presumed to be en-
trepreneurial and thus not covered by the securities laws, since the ultimate
objective of a tender offer is control of the target business rather than invest-
ment. The provisions of the Williams Act amendments9 9 to the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 belie any claim that tender offers for control do not
implicate the securities laws. Although a defeated tender offeror does not have
a claim for damages under the general antifraud provisions of the Williams
Act,1°° the Act affords other protections, including full disclosure and a right
to bring an action for injunctive relief.'0 ' Furthermore, the general antifraud
provision of the Act' 0 2 is applicable regardless of the size of tender offer in-
volved. It is thus clear that the "more than fifty percent" presumption cannot
properly be applied in cases involving either the shareholders of a target com-
pany or the tender offeror. Moreover, these problems with the rule announced
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Sutter are not unique to the tender
offer method of corporate takeover. It is beyond question that the securities
laws apply to mergers that involve purchases of control.'0 3 It would thus be
anomalous to apply the rule to such transactions. Although it is, of course,
possible to limit application of the presumption to closely held companies, the
regulation provided by the securities acts of transactions transferring control
short-term commerical paper. Id. at 1224-25. The Weaver case stands for the proposition that
"certificates of deposit," although included in the statutory definition of "security," are not securi-
ties in some contexts.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
99. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
100. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
101. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 1981); Whittaker Corp. v.
Edgar, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,483 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 1982).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
103. See, e.g., TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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in other instances would seem to contradict even the more limited use of the
doctrine with close corporations. In sum, in the farthest reaching decision to
date, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has distorted by way of undue
expansion the sale of business doctrine, a doctrine that is questionable in its
own right.
A recent court of appeals decision to depart from the King, Oakhil, and
Sutter rationales was delivered by the Second Circuit in Golden v. Garafalo. 104
This currently developing split between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits on
one side, and the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits10 5 on the other, would
appear to make the issue ripe for Supreme Court review. The Golden decision
quite properly limits the Howey-Forman economic reality test to cases involv-
ing "unusual" or "unique" instruments. The court explained:
We think the term "stock" in the definition of "security" in the
'33 and '34 Acts should be read to include instruments, such as these,
which have the characteristics associated with ordinary, conventional
shares of stock. There was little reason for the drafters to use words
such as "stock," "treasury stock" or "voting-trust certificate," unless
their intention was to include all such instruments as commonly de-
fined. If an "economic reality" test were intended, reference to such
specific types of instruments, and common variations of therm,
would have been inappropriate because a substantial portion of each
class of instrument would, in fact, not be within the definition. We
believe that Congress intended to draft an expansive definition and
to include with specificity all instruments with characteristics agreed
upon in the commercial world, such as "debentures," "stock," "treas-
ury stock" or "voting-trust certificates." Catch-all phrases such as
"investment contract," were then included to cover unique instru-
ments not easily classified. If the "economic reality" test were to be
the core of the definition, only general catch-all terms would have
been used.
We are cited to no legislative history contradicting this perfectly
plausible reading of the statutory language. The House Report ac-
companying the bill which became the '33 Act indicated that the def-
inition of "security" was intended to cover "the many types of
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary
concept of a security." H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1933). We regard this statement as support for the proposition that
instruments ordinarily regarded as "stock" are a "security," notwith-
standing that the underlying transaction involves a transfer of con-
trol. This understanding of Congressional intent, moreover, has
been almost universally accepted by the courts, the relevant agency
and the bar for over 40 years. Only after Forman has there been a
serious challenge to this reading of the statutes.' 0 6
This analysis seems to be the most justifiable way of dealing with the issue
104. 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
105. See infra text accompanying note 110.
106. 678 F.2d at 1144.
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under the current statutory framework. Although the weight of authority con-
tinues to be to the contrary, a few courts have seen the wisdom of the Second
Circuit's approach. 10 7 Both the Howey decision and the statutory language
treat "investment contract" and "stock" as two distinct definitions.'08 Al-
though undoubtedly the two distinct terms should be read inparimateria, they
are not synonomous.
The inclusion of "investment contract" in the definition was meant to en-
compass within the coverage of the Securities acts a range of investment de-
vices that create risks similar to those associated with the stock and bond
markets. 10 9 The Howey test reflects the elements of such risks in terms of the
attributes of the transaction in question. By its very nature, stock in a business
enterprise creates at least preexisting contractual rights to attain precisely
those attributes. As the Forman decision indicates, a pragmatic or ad hoc
analysis is appropriate only when (1) the profit motive is lacking and (2) the
"stock" does not possess any of the indicia generally associated with corporate
shares. Along these lines, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Ar-
kansas law, recently refused to apply the sale of business doctrine in lieu of
"the traditional and accepted meaning of the terms 'stock' and 'securities.' " 10
In many cases the transfer of an incorporated sole proprietorship may not
involve the type of risks involved in a traditional securities transaction. As
observed above, however, in such a case the parties have chosen to structure
the transaction in a certain manner with accompanying legal consequences.
The question whether the increased burden on judicial time is warranted by
federalizing such transactions is no doubt a valid one, but that issue should be
addressed upon its own merits, in terms of either additional exemptions or
limitations on the jurisdictional provisions of the securities acts. This question
should not be answered by manipulating the definition of "security," a prac-
tice that in turn encourages abuses by sharp promoters. When the corporate
form is selected, the need arises to prevent such potential abuses that are pres-
ent solely by virtue of the form of the transaction. The next section will con-
sider corporate attributes and ways in which the decision to incorporate in and
of itself creates many of the risks that the securities laws were designed to
regulate.
V. CORPORATE SHARES AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES
When a sole proprietorship, or any other business, decides to incorporate,
it is usually after a careful weighing of relative advantages and disadvan-
tages.'l' If entrepreneurs opt for the corporate form, they do so in spite of the
107. See supra note 57.
108. In addition to Garafalo, see Cole v. PPG Indus., 680 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1982); Sterling
Recreation Org. Co. v. Segal, 537 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Colo. 1982); Dillport, supra note 67, at 114-15.
109. See supra note 13.
110. Cole v. PPG Indus., 680 F.2d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 1982).
111. The most frequently cited advantages include:
(1) The capacity to act as a legal unit, to hold property, to contract, to sue and be
sued as a distinct entity; (2) limitation of or exemption from individual liability of share-
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general wisdom, "When in doubt, don't incorporate."' "12 In many instances
the decision will be made for tax reasons,'13 but will, nevertheless, have sub-
stantial impact upon the way in which the business is to be conducted. The
planner thus must consider all of the merits and drawbacks before opting for
the corporate structure. When making such a closely balanced decision, it is
neither unusual nor overly burdensome to expect that certain predictable con-
sequences will follow. As will be demonstrated below, at least under the cur-
rent statutes, the coverage of the general antifraud provisions of the securities
laws should be considered a highly reasonable consequence of incorporation.
Even when the primary reason for the corporate form is to create a tax
advantage, there are five structural consequences for the business that follow
upon incorporation. First, there is limited liability of the shareholders that
renders their shares nonassessable: the investor, or investors, will not be liable
beyond the initial investment, even if the business incurs more liabilities than
its assets are able to cover. Second, there is continuity of edstence, which
means, for example, that upon the owner's death the business passes through
the estate as a solitary unit, unless the corporation is dissolved and the assets
liquidated. Accordingly, when a sole proprietor dies with more than one heir,
the control of the business is likely to be split, and even the business itself may
be so divided. By contrast, in the case of a corporation, the business will con-
tinue, but the identity of its owners will change. Third, corporate shares, un-
like interests in a general partnership, are freely transferable.' 14 The fourth
consequence of the corporate form is centralization of management. Because
corporation statutes mandate a board of directors'1 5 and certain designated
holders; (3) continuity of existence; (4) transferability of shares; (5) centralized manage-
ment by the board of directors; (6) standardized methods of organization, management
and finance prescribed by corporation acts for the protection of shareholders and credi-
tors, including a more or less standardized system of shareholders' relations, rights and
remedies.
H. BALLANTINE, supra note 25, at 3; see also 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5-7, 10-14 (rev. ed. 1974); 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.12 (2d
ed. 1971); C. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 2.01-
.51 (5th ed. 1975); Hazen, supra note 11.
112. G. SEWARD, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE 8 (ALI-ABA rev. ed. 1966):
When in doubt, don't incorporate. Many small corporations are formed inadvis-
edly. The corporate form of doing business is probably disadvantageous for a small new
venture. The cost of the privilege of limited liability will probably be too high. Not only
is there expense involved in forming and maintaining a corporation which a sole propri-
etor would not have to pay, but there may be serious tax disadvantages. The double tax
on corporate income distributed as dividends makes the corporate form of doing busi-
ness basically unattractive. Only by taking advantage of the exceptions and the unusual
rovisions in the law is the corporate form made attractive for the typical small venture.
Hence a basic rule: don't incorporate unless the advantages are worth the cost. Time
devoted at the outset to determining whether incorporation is advisable, will be well
spent.
113. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS (4th ed. 1979); Z. CAVITCH, TAX PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS (1974).
114. This factor was one of the classic indicia of stock that was absent in Forman. See supra
text accompanying note 48.
115. The board of directors of a corporation is elected by the shareholders, and it is statutorily
vested with directing the management of the business. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West
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officers,1 16 this form necessarily contemplates a centralized management. A
correlative aspect of centralized management is flexibility in creating the man-
agement infrastructure. 17 Although this hierarchy may not in fact exist at
any given time in a closely held corporation, it remains an integral part of the
corporate charter, a method of enterprise management that is foreign to the
small business whether in the form of a sole proprietorship or general partner-
ship." 8 The fifth general corporate attribute is flexibility in capitalization-
for example, through the use of different classes of stock and debt/equity hy-
brids such as preferred stock and convertible bonds. Since these types of se-
nior securities generally are not authorized in single-person closely held
corporations, this aspect of capital flexibility is not related to the problem now
under consideration.
The above five factors are crucial in distinguishing the corporate form of
business from the general partnership or sole proprietorship. Significantly, all
of these factors were lacking in Forman, but most if not all are present in the
case of a closely held business. In addition, the corporate form of doing busi-
ness necessarily creates contractual obligations that do not otherwise exist. It
is classic black-letter law that the corporation is a myriad of contractual rela-
tionships, including those among the shareholders themselves, between the
shareholders and the corporation (which is generally embodied in the share
agreement through the articles of incorporation), and between all of the par-
ties and the state.' 19 These contractual interrelationships create an element of
common enterprise even in a one-person corporation. The corporation exists
under the law as a separate entity with its own inherent powers,120 regardless
Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-24
(1975); MODEL BUsINESS CORP. AcT § 35 (1977).
116. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-44
(1975); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. § 50 (1977).
117. This result can be accomplished, for example, through the delegation of managerial au-
thority to committees. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT. §§ 35, 42 (1977).
118. Both the limited partnership and the "Massachusetts" business trust afford similar sepa-
ration of ownership from control. Both of these methods of dividing a business are generally held
to involve securities. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 417-425 (5th Cir. 1981) (consider-
ing the impact of reliance upon efforts of others in transforming a partnership interest into a
security); see also Freedman, An Ana ysis of the Franchise Agreement Under Federal Securities
Laws, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 919 (1976). See generally Long, Parnership, LimitedPartnershp, and
Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. Rev. 581 (1972).
119. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 25, § 18.
120. This characteristic has been recognized from the inception of corporate law:
These artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate ... or corpora-
tions: of which there is a great variety subsisting, for the advancement of religion, of
learning, and of commerce; in order to preserve entire and forever those rights and im-
munities, which, if they were granted only to those individuals of which the body corpo-
rate is composed, would upon their death be utterly lost and extinct.
After a corporation is so formed and named, it acquires many powers, rights, capac-
ities, and incapacities, which we are next to consider. Some of these are necessarily and
inseparably incident to every corporation .... As, 1. To have perpetual succession.
This is the very end of its incorporation: for there cannot be a succession for ever with-
out an incorporation; and therefore all aggregate corporations have a power necessarily
implied of electing members in the room of such as go off. 2. To sue or be sued, im-
plead or be impleaded, grant or receive, by its corporate name, and do all other acts as
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of whether such powers are exercised at any particular time. It is a discrete
unit that not only presents the separation of ownership from control, which is
an element of a "security," but also a number of inchoate qualities that dupli-
cate the elements of the Howey test for finding an investment.
In determining whether a particular ownership interest is a security, many
courts have come to view the presence of a common enterprise as a predomi-
nant factor. 12' This consideration, of course, is one of the four items empha-
sized by the Supreme Court in Howey. 122 The "common enterprise" analysis
focuses upon a finding that the investor's participation be pooled in some way
with that of others, or be dependent upon the participation of another who
also shares the investment risk. A number of courts have relied upon the
commonality requirement as a means of excluding pure service contracts.
This result can best be understood by illustration. When faced with the ques-
tion whether a managed individual brokerage account is a security, some
courts have found the absence of a common enterprise to compel a negative
answer. 123 The result has been based on reasoning that the customer's funds
were not pooled with those of another, and further that the investment advisor
was viewed as merely providing a service. In contrast, other courts have held
that the investment advisor's interest-by way of sales commission and man-
agement fee-in the success of the investment decisions presented sufficient
vertical commonality to find the investment account itself to be a security.124
These cases thus do not require an actual pooling of funds, and could easily be
extended by analogy to the common enterprise between the sole shareholder
and the separate corporate entity.
Even under a strict view of the requirement that there be a common en-
terprise, shares of stock in the one-person corporation would seem to qualify
for treatment as a security. Since the corporate form does create a separate
legal entity, except in cases of sham or other gross abuse, the law treats the
single owner and his corporation as two distinct persons. 25 This structural
independence creates contractual and fiduciary obligations between the own-
natural persons may. 3. To purchase lands, and hold them, for the benefit of them-
selves and their successors; which two are consequential to the former. 4. To have a
common seal .... For, though the particular members may express their private con-
sent to any acts, by words, or signing their names, yet this does not bind the corporation:
it is the fixing of the seal, and that only, which unites the several assents of the individu-
als .... 5. To make by-laws or private statutes for the better government of the cor-
poration; which are binding upon themselves, unless contrary to the laws of the land,
and then they are void.
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *467, *475-76. See generally H. BALLANTINEI, supra note 25, ch.
X; H. HENN, supra note 76, § 80.
121. See, e.g.,supra note 46.
122. See supra text accompanying note 23.
123. Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); Minarik v. M-S Commodities, 457
F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Wasnowic v. Board of Trade, 352 F. Supp.
1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aft'dmera, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974).
124. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Booth v.
Peavey Co. Commodities Servs., 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970) (private remedy for churning a
commodity account is permitted under the Securities Act of 1933).
125. See generally H. BALLANTINE, supra note 25, § 118-120, at 287-90; H. HENN, supra note
76, § 258, at 508-09.
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er-manager and the corporation. Because the success of the business affects
both the owner and the corporate entity, the common enterprise requirement
is satisfied. Use of the corporate form also requires different conduct and re-
sults in different consequences than would be the case with an unincorporated
sole proprietorship: compliance with corporate formalities such as sharehold-
ers' meetings, taxation of the corporate franchise, and state stock transfer taxes
are among those differences. It does not seem inappropriate to include among
those differences compliance with the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws, at least in the absence of an express statutory exclusion.
The concept of the one-person corporation exists in a certain tension with
that of the pure corporate form, and courts have long been aware of the poten-
tial for abuse. 126 It would seem anomalous to increase the potential for abuse
by excluding the transfer of shares from the ambit of the securities laws. It is
well recognized that the corporate franchise is a privilege conferred by the
state, which frequently requires the imposition of controls to prevent
abuses.127 It is thus not novel to maintain that selection of stock as a means of
ownership should carry with it the regulatory provisions adopted to prevent
abuses in connection with that type of investment vehicle.
Most of the potential abuses by the one-person corporation that are cited
when imposing legal limitations are directed towards the protection of credi-
tors who may suffer loss because of the owner's limited liability. 128 Taking
advantage of the corporate form thus insulates the owner from a significant
risk generally associated with private enterprise. To give this protection on the
one hand, and on the other to deny to prospective purchasers the protections
that appear to exist on the face of the securities laws, simultaneously gives the
owner the advantage of corporateness vis-A-vis creditors and the advantage of
noncorporateness with regard to purchasers of his ownership interest.129 This
accommodation is especially unnecessary in light of the readily available alter-
native structure for any sale of a business in the form of a straight sale of
assets.
When there is a transfer of control in a closely held business, there are
several interests that need to be protected. In control transfers of corporations
with minority shareholders the law imposes safeguards against abuses by the
selling majority shareholder.' 30 As noted above, these provisions may be
viewed as signaling the need for the additional protections of the securities
126. See, ag., Note, One-Man Corporations-Scope and Limitations, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 853
(1952).
127. 'The privilege of being and acting as a corporation is nonetheless a grant by the state
merely because the state prescribes in a general corporation law certain conditions upon which it
may be acquired by all applicants." H. BALLANTINE, supra note 25, at 64.
128. See Note, supra note 126.
129. In other areas when deemed appropriate, Congress has acted expressly to allow for
noncorporate treatment of closely held corporations. One such example is Subchapter S of the
Internal Revenue Code, which allows for partnership-type tax treatment for qualifying corpora-
tions. I.R.C. § 1371-1379 (Supp. IV 1980). Congress could make similar concessions for closely
held corporations in the federal securities laws.
130. See Hazen, supra note 88.
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laws when dealing with the sale of less than all of a corporation's stock. In
addition, certain protections are afforded to creditors.' 3' Creditors and ex-
isting shareholders are two constituencies traditionally given special protection
by corporate law.' 32 There even exist protections for future shareholders. 133
The securities laws extended additional protections to present and future
shareholders to the extent that they are investors as well as proprietors or own-
ers of the business. 134 It is thus not unreasonable to provide protection for
purchasers of the stock beyond those that already exist at common law.
As far as the creditors of a corporation are concerned, the choice between
a sale of stock or transfer of assets may have a significant impact on their
rights against the debtor, and similar distinctions should exist in securities law
issues as they relate to a purchaser's rights against the seller. Under the line of
decisions finding the sale of one hundred percent of a company's stock not to
be a security under the sale of business exception, the seller is able to exact a
double benefit. First, the seller can take advantage of limited liability vis-A-vis
creditors and, under what is now the majority view, at the same time deny the
purchaser of the business the protection of the antifraud provisions of the se-
curities laws. Second, in structuring the transaction, the seller can deny to
creditors rights that would otherwise arise under the Uniform Commercial
Code's bulk transfer provisions, 135 which apply to sales of certain assets but
not to complete transfer of ownership through the sale of some or all of the
corporate stock. In this instance the law recognizes that the choice of a certain
form for the transaction should carry with it certain consequences. There is no
reason to vary the result with regard to the applicability of the securities laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
The sale of a business is-or at least, should be-a carefully structured
transaction. Both the purchaser and seller are free to negotiate the various
terms of the transfer, including the ultimate form the transaction will take.
Because certainty in planning and predictability of result are important ele-
ments of any business deal, leaving the question of the applicability of securi-
ties laws to an ad hoc, after-the-fact determination is clearly contrary to this
131. See, eg., UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT, 7A U.L.A. 164 (1981).
132. Corporation statutes define the rights of shareholders both in terms of power to control
and the right to participate in the proceeds of the business. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
AcT. §§ 15, 32, 58 (1977). These statutes also protect creditors by limiting the director's ability to
deplete corporate assets by way of dividends or otherwise. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. fit. 8,
§§ 170-174 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1981);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT. §45 (1977).
133. See, eg., San Juan Uranium Corp. v. Wolfe, 241 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1957); Old Domin-
ion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909), aft'd, 225 U.S.
111 (1912). But see Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206
(1907).
134. Share ownership brings with it a variety of interests. As an owner of the business, the
shareholder has a proprietary interest and correlative rights. As an investor, the shareholder may
have concerns such as full disclosure regarding his investment. For furth.-r discussion of the
shareholder proprietor/investor distinction, see Hazen, supra note 93.
135. U.C.C. § 6-106 to -111 (1977).
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goal. It is much easier for parties to bargain over the form of the transaction if
the consequences are clear. The bargaining process then allows them to place
a negotiated price on the risks that are so allocated.
The issues discussed above relate to the transfer of a one hundred percent
ownership interest in a closely held corporation. The suggestion by some
courts 136 that the transfer of less than one hundred percent of the stock may be
within the sale of business exclusion is even more troublesome because of the
line-drawing problems which arise in that context. In such a case, the minor-
ity interests belie any claim that the transaction is a sale of assets, since at the
very least the majority owes fiduciary duties to the minority that owns a por-
tion of those assets.
In sum, for both conceptual and practical reasons, the sale of business
doctrine is not the appropriate method for excluding sales of close corpora-
tions from the coverage of the securities laws. An explicit legislative enact-
ment to the contrary would, of course, vindicate the concerns of the courts
using the sale of business rationale, and such an enactment is the most logical
way to implement those policies.
The only reasonable application of the sale of business doctrine under the
current statutory framework would be when, as in Forman, all the traditional
indicia of stock are absent. For example, if the stock of a corporation were
clearly nontransferable, and if profits were to be paid out in salary for services
rendered rather than reinvested (thus precluding appreciation of the value of
the stock), then the Forman decision might justify a finding that the stock is
not in fact stock. This hypothetical, however, represents the aberrational case
and does not reflect the facts in any of the sale of business cases decided to
date. In the typical sale of business through stock, the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws should thus apply.
136. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (1Ith
Cir. 1982); OakhiUl Cemetery v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also s1~ra
text accompanying note 55.
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